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A Tale of Two Portlands: How Port Cities Can Survive
Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to Fossil Fuel Shipping
Restrictions
Kayla Race, J.D. Candidate, 2020
Abstract
Five port cities—Portland, Oregon; South Portland, Maine; Oakland,
California; Longview, Washington; and Salt Lake City, Utah—have
something in common: they all restricted the handling of fossil fuels at their
shipping terminals. Moreover, impacted industries have responded with
nearly identical dormant Commerce Clause-based lawsuits against the first
four of those localities. This Article examines how much latitude cities have
under the dormant Commerce Clause to restrict the handling of fossil fuels
at their ports, using as case studies two recent court decisions upholding
the ordinances of Portland, Oregon and South Portland, Maine under the
dormant Commerce Clause. In addition, because the shipment of Utah coal
ties together the ports in Oakland, California, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
Longview, Washington, this Article evaluates the constitutionality of
Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s fossil fuel handling ordinances, concluding
that the dormant Commerce Clause provides ample room to restrict fossil
fuels at these and other ports.

I. Introduction
On May 15, 2018, a federal district court in California handed down
a ruling that had Utah’s coal country cheering, while leaving communities
elsewhere to question the extent of their own authority to protect their
health from fossil fuel emissions.1 The court struck down the City of
Oakland’s coal-handling ban down as-applied to the Oakland Bulk and
Oversized Terminal.2 This ruling in Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal
v. City of Oakland3 (hereinafter “Oakland”) is now on appeal to the U.S.
1. See Brian Maffly, In a Potential Boon to Rural Utah, Judge Overturns Oakland’s
Ban on Coal Shipment Through its Port, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 16, 2018), https://
perma.cc/AP8A-AEAH.
2. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d
986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018).
3. 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4 If upheld, this ruling opens the
door for five million tons of Utah coal to ship through Oakland each year,5
with $53 million of Utah public funds supporting the Terminal’s
development.6 Alternatively, if the Ninth Circuit overturns the district
court’s contractually based ruling,7 the court may turn to the plaintiff’s
alternative claims that the City’s actions violated the dormant Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution8 and were preempted by federal statutes.9
The outcome of that decision could have far-reaching implications for other
Utah coal cases and for other port cities seeking to limit fossil fuels, as
explained below.
On the same day as the release of the Oakland ruling favoring Utah
coal, the State of Utah joined an amicus brief in Lighthouse Resources v.
Inslee,10 arguing that the State of Washington violated the dormant
Commerce Clause when it denied a permit for a coal terminal expansion in
Longview, Washington.11 This lawsuit was brought by a Utah-based coal

4. Id.
5. See Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 989–90; Brian
Maffly, Utah’s Top Coal Producer is Fighting to Reverse a California City’s Ban on
Exporting Coal and Open New Markets for Local Mines, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://perma.cc/GEA4-CKCA [hereinafter, Utah’s Top Coal Producer] (“The investment
guaranteed 5 million to 10 million tons of Utah coal would move through the California
terminal every year.”).
6. See Press Release, EARTHJUSTICE, Utah Legislature Votes to Fund California Coal
Export Terminal at Taxpayer Expense (Mar. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZS2Q-J7LW;
Utah’s Top Coal Producer, supra note 5.
7. See Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 992. The district
court’s decision was based solely on the contract between the City of Oakland and OBOT.
Id. The court deferred on addressing the constitutional and federal preemption claims raised
by the plaintiffs, explaining that it would be “unnecessary to adjudicate those potentially
more weighty questions if the case could be resolved on the breach of contract claim.” Id.
8. The dormant Commerce Clause is the judicially created doctrine that recognizes
an implied limitation on states’ ability to limit interstate commerce, based on Congress’s
Constitutionally delegated power to regulate interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. Art I.,
§8, cl. 3; see also infra Part III.
9. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 991. The federal statutes
that Plaintiffs alleged were violated include the “Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, and the Shipping Act of
1984.” Id.
10. Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan.
3, 2018).
11. State of Wyoming, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Utah’s
Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Lighthouse Resources, Inc. v. Inlsee, No.
3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. motion and brief filed May 8, 2018); see also Phuong Le, 5
States Join Utah in Legal Fight over Washington State Coal-Export Terminal, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (May 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/43TY-9LH9.
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company and is making its way through a federal district court in
Washington.12
Following these developments, other courts have ruled on similar
challenges to fossil fuel shipping-related restrictions in two more port
cities: South Portland, Maine13 and Portland, Oregon.14 This time,
however, the courts favored the cities in full15 and in part,16 respectively.
An appeal of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s decision in
the South Portland, Maine case is currently pending in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.17
Finally, and most recently, in December 2018, Salt Lake City, Utah
adopted an ordinance that restricts the handling and storing of coal and
prohibits extractive industries and refineries18 in a new, to-be-developed
“Utah Inland Port.”19 No legal challenges to Salt Lake City’s ordinance
have been reported (yet), but a challenge would be unsurprising given the
years-long political battle over the Inland Port and the state of Utah’s
vigorous commitment to building it, despite protests by the local
community, environmental groups, and the Mayor of Salt Lake.20 This

12. The plaintiff, Lighthouse Resources, Inc., is headquartered in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 16, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D.
Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018).
13. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264 (D. Me.
2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
14. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018).
15. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 269 (holding South Portland’s
ordinance blocking crude oil exports did not violate dormant Commerce Clause); see also
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D. Me. 2017)
(holding South Portland’s ordinance was not preempted by state or federal laws).
16. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 261 (holding Portland’s ordinance did not violate
dormant Commerce Clause but remanding with respect to certain factual findings).
17. City of So. Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
18. Salt Lake City, Utah, Ordinance No. 69-18 of 2018, An Ordinance Amending
Various Sections of Title 21A of the Salt Lake City Code Pertaining to Regulation of Inland
Port Uses (codified at SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH CODE, § 21A.34.150(E)(1)(b) (Sterling
Codifiers through June 11, 2019)), https:// perma.cc/5LLG-SHPK; id. at § (B)(2)(f) (refinery
and extractive industry prohibitions); see also Taylor Stevens, Salt Lake City Council Passes
Rules Aimed at Regulating the Inland Port, a Massive Development Planned for the West
Side, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/RTP5-4X3H.
19. The Utah Inland Port was created by the Utah Legislature in March 2018. Utah
Inland Port Authority Act, S.B. 234 (Mar. 2018), as amended by Utah Inland Port Authority
Amendments, H.B. 2001 (July 2018), Utah Code §§ 11-58-101–901 (2018).
20. See Taylor Stevens, House Committee Approves Bill to Expand Inland Port over
Opposition from Environmental Groups, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar 5, 2019), https://
perma.cc/M8CZ-5SW6 (describing a Utah state bill to expand the inland port into rural
communities); Brian Maffly, Utah coal country’s push for a West Coast deep-water port
resurfaces as Senate panel advances funding plan, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2019),
83
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tension has already come to a head in the form of a lawsuit by Salt Lake
City against the Port.21 A lawsuit in the other direction would be in line
with the Utah Inland Port’s chaotic start and the aforementioned lawsuits
in Oakland, Portland, and South Portland.
The fate of a potential challenge against Salt Lake City’s ordinance
may be heavily impacted by the appeals pending the First Circuit 22 and
Ninth Circuit,23 over South Portland’s and Oakland’s respective fossil fuel
shipping bans. In addition, these lawsuits may have implications for the
broader, nationwide trend of local and state efforts to limit fossil fuels and
the accompanying trend of industry-led lawsuits challenging such
regulations.24 Cities, in particular, have been leading the charge to reduce
fossil fuel-related emissions25 in the face of growing climate change-related
threats such as forest fires,26 heat-related deaths,27 and other extreme

https://perma.cc/Y7NU-K3JR (describing ongoing moves by Utah officials to allocate $53
million to the coal proposed terminal in Oakland, California).
21. Katie McKeller, Salt Lake City Mayor Sues over ‘Gross State Overreach’ in Utah
Inland Port Authority’s Creation, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/AZ2TQQY2. Previously, Salt Lake City Mayor Biskupski had referenced potential Utah
Constitutional challenges to the Port, and former Salt Lake City Mayor Ted Wilson alleged
that the Utah Inland Port Authority violates the Utah Constitution’s “Ripper Clause.” See
Ted Wilson, Letter: Salt Lake Inland Port Will be Tied up in Court, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July
23, 2018), https://perma.cc/RVM9-SSG2; see also Matthew Piper, Some Think One
Sentence in the Utah Constitution Might Undo the Inland Port Authority, DESERET NEWS
(July 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/RVM9-SSG2.
22. City of South Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
23. OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018).
24. See generally Benjamin L. McCready, Note, Like it or Not, You’re Fracked: Why
State Preemption of Municipal Bans are Unjustified in the Fracking Context, 9 DREXEL L.
REV. ONLINE 61 (2016) (describing municipal regulation of oil and gas fracking and legal
challenges to such regulation); Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory
Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 192
(describing constitutional claims against state renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs,
and other climate and energy policies).
25. See, e.g., Salt Lake City, Joint Resolution of Salt Lake City Council and Mayor
Establishing Renewable Energy and Carbon Emissions Reduction Goals for Salt Lake City
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/C4N4-VSTX; CITY OF SAN DIEGO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN,
CITY OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/9VUC-JK52 (San Diego’s Climate Action
Plan, which was adopted unanimously in December 2015, commits San Diego to 100%
clean energy, achieving 50% of commutes via transit, walking, and biking, covering 35%
of urban areas with tree canopy, and eliminating waste.); Chris Teale, Cities Bullish on Need
to Lead at US Conference of Mayors’ Annual Meeting, SMARTCITIES DIVE (June 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/U7TW-L9KT.
26. Matthew Brown, Driven by Climate Change, Fire Reshapes U.S. West, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/F4Z9-8GAJ.
27. Jonathan Watts, We Have 12 years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns
UN, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/GY9Q-N33T.
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weather events.28 While states like Utah fail to meet federal air quality
standards,29 cities have been picking up the slack. Cities are acting to
counterbalance the Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks, which
have included withdrawing the United States from the global Paris climate
accord,30 repealing the Clean Power Plan,31 proposing to freeze greenhouse
gas based fuel economy standards for cars,32 and repealing or loosening
emissions standards on certain truck components,33 among other regressive
actions. City-level environmental action has taken many forms in recent
years, including shifting to renewable energy, making buildings more
efficient, promoting alternative transportation,34 and banning fracking.35

28. Fiona Harvey, Why the Next Three Months are Crucial for the Future of the
Planet, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/54H2-674R.
29. See Emma Penrod, EPA Labels Utah Air-Quality Problems ‘serious’, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/EHW7-5T33 (describing “serious” nonattainment for
PM2.5 and how several areas in Utah, including the Salt Lake metro area, are in “serious nonattainment” of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulate matter (PM2.5)
and “marginal non-attainment” for ozone); Emma Penrod, Feds Give Utah Three Years to
Bring Ozone Pollution Down to Acceptable Levels, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/VP2Q-J4MZ (reporting seven Utah counties, including Salt Lake, were in
violation of national ozone standards); Emma Penrod, Advocates Growing Impatient as
Utah’s New Plan for Cleaner Air Falls Behind Schedule, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7WSH-ZJDJ (describing Utah’s history of missing deadlines, and that state
officials notified the U.S. EPA that Utah would likely miss the December 2017 deadline for
its PM2.5 compliance plan); Status of SIP Required Elements for Utah Designated Areas,
U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/7E8C-FKDL (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (showing 12/31/2017
deadline for compliance reports for PM2.5 for Salt Lake City and Provo metro areas’
“serious” nonattainment, but none had not been submitted as of Oct. 9, 2018).
30. Hiroko Tabuchi and Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and
Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/33Q4KP4G; Chris Teale, Report: US Almost halfway to achieving Paris climate goals thanks to
city, state action, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/K8CX-M7E6.
31. The “Clean Power Plan” was adopted under the Obama administration and
required states to implement controls on greenhouse gas emissions from existing power
plants. 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015). The Trump administration repealed the Clean
Power Plan in August 2018. 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018).
32. The Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years
2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018)
(to be codified at: 49 C.F.R. pts 523, 531, 533, 536, and 537; and 40 C.F.R. pts 85-86); see
also Coral Davenport and Hiroko Tabuchi, E.P.A. Prepares to Roll Back Rules Requiring
Cars to be Cleaner and More Efficient, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/86EF53ZT.
33. Juliet Eilperin, EPA plans to repeal emission standards for truck components,
WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z7UQ-F9XS.
34. Jason Plautz, Survey: 57% of Cities Plan Climate Action in Next Year, UTILITY
DIVE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/6KK4-SNBA.
35. See generally McCready, supra note 24 (reviewing cases litigating municipal
regulation of oil and gas fracking).
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Legal scholarship has examined the authority of state36 and local37
governments to adopt many kinds restrictions on fossil fuels. However,
there is a gap in scholarship addressing the particular trend embodied in the
Oakland, South Portland, Portland, Lighthouse Resources, and Salt Lake
City cases: local restrictions on the handling and storage of coal and oil in
ports, and the legal backlash these restrictions have incited. This Article
fills that gap by examining this trend and its unique and emerging ties with
Utah’s coal industry.38 Specifically, this Article observes that the fossil fuel
industry has been serving ports with lawsuits that make the same three
kinds of claims which are worthy of scholarly attention: (1) violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution;39 (2) preemption by
federal laws governing trains, ports, and pipelines; and (3) state preemption
of municipal authority.40
Moreover, this Article seeks to put the dormant Commerce Clause
issues to rest, because local governments have a more important role than
ever in ensuring all people to have healthy places to live, work, and play,41
and because the same kinds of industry-led challenges keep recurring and
may resurface in Salt Lake City. Specifically, this Article examines how
much latitude cities have under the dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit

36. See, e.g., Mormann, supra note 24, at 192 (describing Constitutional challenges
to state renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and other state climate and energy
policies); Tessa Gellerson, Extraterritoriality and the Electric Grid: North Dakota v.
Heydinger, A Case Study for State Energy Regulation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 563, 56970 (2017) (discussing an Eight Circuit decision striking down North Dakota’s Renewable
Portfolio Standard).
37. See, e.g., McCready, supra note 24 (reviewing litigation over municipal
regulation of oil and gas fracking); Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption,
70 STAN. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (June 2018) (criticizing new and extreme efforts by states
to preempt local government laws); Thomas Linzey and Daniel E. Brannen Jr., A Phoenix
from the Ashes: Resurrecting A Constitutional Right of Local, Community Self-Government
in the Name of Environmental Sustainability, 8 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (arguing
“community self-governance” for environmental issues should be recognized as a
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution).
38. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 8.
40. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d
986, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2018) appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018)
(plaintiffs raised dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and contractual claims);
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 270 (D. Me. 2018)
(plaintiffs raised dormant Commerce Clause, and federal and state preemption claims),
appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018); Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades
Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 261 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (plaintiffs raised dormant
Commerce Clause and state statute claims), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018); Complaint
at ¶11, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018)
(raising dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption claims).
41. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
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or restrict handling and storing coal and oil at ports, using the decisions in
the Portland, Oregon42 and South Portland, Maine43 litigation as case
studies and applying those lessons to the ordinances in Salt Lake City, Utah
and Oakland, California. This Article focuses on the dormant Commerce
Clause because it is comparable across jurisdictions and because it seems
particularly prone to revival in cases involving Utah coal, given that Utah
officials raised dormant Commerce Clause claims in the Longview,
Washington case44 and in a threatened suit over California’s cap-and-trade
program.45
This Article proceeds in Part II with background on the fossil fuel
restrictions in five cities: South Portland, Maine; Portland, Oregon;
Oakland, California; Longview, Washington; and Salt Lake City, Utah.
Part III explores the parameters of the dormant Commerce Clause as
established by the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals and as
applied by courts in the Portland and South Portland cases. Part IV
analyzes how those parameters comfortably allow the ordinances adopted
by Salt Lake City and Oakland. This Article concludes there is room under
the dormant Commerce Clause for port cities to lawfully ban or restrict the
storage and handling of fossil fuels.

II. Background on Port-City Fossil Fuel Restrictions
Multiple ports have imposed restrictions on storing and handling coal,
crude oil, and fossil fuels. This Part provides an overview of those
restrictions in South Portland, Maine, Portland, Oregon, Longview,
Washington, Oakland, California, and Salt Lake City, Utah, as well as an
overview of the legal challenges that have arisen in the first four of those
localities.
A. South Portland, Maine’s “Clear Skies Ordinance” on Crude
Oil Exports

In July 2014, the City of South Portland, Maine, adopted its “Clear
Skies Ordinance,” which essentially bars the export of crude oil by ship
42. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258.
43. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 269.
44. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
45. See Brian Maffly, In a Potential Boon to Rural Utah, Judge Overturns Oakland’s
Ban on Coal Shipment Through its Port, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 16, 2018), https://
perma.cc/AP8A-AEAH (reporting that “Utah has set aside $1.5 million to sue California
over its cap-and-trade program”); Brian Maffly, Are California Climate Policies Unfair to
Utah?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/6ZXX-ZQTV (reporting that
Utah Rep. Mike Noel asserted California’s cap-and-trade system is “a clear violation of the
U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause” because it makes Utah coal-powered electricity
more expensive in California).
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from South Portland’s waterfront.46 Specifically, the Clear Skies
Ordinance blocks the “bulk loading of crude oil onto marine tank vessels”
(also referred to as “tankers”).47 The Ordinance also bars the “storing and
handling of petroleum and/or petroleum products” and the “construction”
or “modification” of “new or existing facilities, structures, and equipment
. . . for the purpose of bulk loading of crude oil” onto tankers.48 The City
adopted this Ordinance after the Portland Pipe Line Corporation considered
reversing the flow of a 70-year-old oil pipeline in order to export Canadian
tar sands oil to international markets via South Portland.49
In February 2015, the Portland Pipeline Corporation and the
American Waterways Operators filed a lawsuit against the City of South
Portland, alleging the Clear Skies Ordinance violated the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses, and was preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act,
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and two state laws.50 In 2017, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maine ruled the Ordinance was not
preempted by federal or state law.51 In August 2018, the court in Portland
Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland (hereinafter “South Portland”)
upheld South Portland’s Clear Skies Ordinance against the dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.52 An appeal of the district court’s decision is
now pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.53

46. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 282–83.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 276–82.
50. Id. at 270. The state law claims were brought under Maine’s Oil Discharge
Prevention Law and South Portland’s comprehensive plan. See id. The plaintiffs also
alleged the Ordinance is preempted by the President’s foreign affairs power and “the
Constitution’s embedded principle of federal maritime governance.” Id.
51. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D. Me.
2017) (holding that South Portland was entitled to Summary Judgement against the
plaintiff’s federal and state preemption claims).
52. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d. at 298–316 (holding, after a bench trial,
that South Portland’s ordinance did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause; specifically,
the ordinance did not have an impermissible extraterritorial reach, nor did it discriminate
against interstate commerce on its face, in effect, or on purpose, nor did it impose an
excessive burden on interstate commerce, nor did it impermissibly interfere with foreign
relations); see also Sabrina Shankman, South Portland’s Tar Sands Ban Upheld in a ‘David
vs. Goliath’ Pipeline Battle, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/
BV9A-C5PE.
53. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed
Nov. 13, 2018).
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B. Portland, Oregon’s Cap on Large Fossil Fuel Terminals

In June 2016, the City of Portland, Oregon adopted a policy that
prohibits the expansion or construction of “bulk fossil fuel terminals that
store more than 2 million gallons of fossil fuel.”54 At the same time,
the policy allowed exceptions for such large terminals in “places like
airports . . . retail gas stations, and terminals built for distributors and
wholesalers who receive and deliver fuel solely by trucks.”55
Similar to the situation in South Portland, Maine, an industry group
challenged the Portland, Oregon ordinance on multiple grounds, including
alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause. And, similar again to
the outcome of the South Portland, Maine case, the Oregon Court of
Appeals in Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland
(hereinafter “Portland”) upheld Portland, Oregon’s policy against the
dormant Commerce Clause challenge in January 2018.56 The Oregon
Supreme Court declined to review this decision in July 2018.57 However,
unlike the South Portland decision that struck down all of the plaintiff’s
claims,58 the Portland, Oregon decision concluded the ordinance here did
not meet a state requirement that land use decisions be supported by an
“adequate factual basis,” because one of the city’s factual findings
(forecasting a decline in fossil fuel demand) did not fully combat
countervailing evidence.59 Therefore, although the court held the ordinance
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, Portland must now provide
additional facts to satisfy the state evidentiary standard before putting its
ordinance into effect.60

54. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 262 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018). By converse, the policy allowed terminals
storing less than 2 million gallons of fossil fuels. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 261; see also Steve Law, Court Decision Means Portland Can Sharply
Restrict Fossil Fuel Terminal Expansion, PORTLAND TRIB. (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/
C6NY-BGSN.
57. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018)
(decision published without opinion, denying petition for review of 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct.
App. 2018)).
58. See id. at Part II. A.
59. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 268–271
(Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018) (noting, however, that the court used a
standard of review that was deferential to the Land Use Board of Appeal’s decision).
60. See Sean Mahoney, A Tale of Two Portlands, CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/L6MG-JEYX.
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C. Port of Longview, Washington Coal Terminal Permit Denials

On January 3, 2018, a coal mining company headquartered in Salt
Lake City, Utah, filed suit against the state of Washington for denying
permits for a port facility that would export coal to Asia.61 The complaint
alleges violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption by the
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act and the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act.62 The state of Utah joined an amicus brief
supporting the plaintiff’s dormant Commerce Clause claim on the same day
the Oakland district court ruling was released.63
D. Oakland, California’s Coal Handling Ban

Not every port city has fared as well in court as the two Portlands.64
On May 15, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California invalidated the City of Oakland, California’s application of a
coal-handling ban to the Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal
(“OBOT”).65 Four years earlier, a subsidiary of Utah’s largest coal
producer, Bowie Resource Partners, secured the contractual right to
manage the Oakland Terminal and ship approximately five million tons of
Utah coal through it each year.66 Such a deal would be a boon to Utah’s
coal industry, which has declined over the last two decades.67 In fact,
annual production slipped to 13.9 million tons in 2016—the lowest reported
amount since 1985.68 Hoping to help secure this potential boost to Utah
coal shipping, the Utah Legislature allocated $53 million in 2016 to help
61. Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 16, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005
(W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018).
62. Id. at ¶11.
63. State of Wyoming, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Utah’s
Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Lighthouse Resources, Inc. v. Inlsee,
No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash., Motion and Brief Filed May 8, 2018); see also Le,
supra note 11.
64. See supra Sections II.A and II.B.
65. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d
986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141
(9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018).
66. The City of Oakland contracted with OBOT in 2012-13 to develop a bulk goods
shipping terminal. Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 988–90.
OBOT later contracted with Terminal Logistics Solutions to design and manage the
terminal. Id. Terminal Logistics Solutions is a wholly owned by Bowie Resource Partners.
Id. In September 2015, OBOT gave the City initial plans for the terminal, including plans
to handle roughly 5 million metric tons of coal there each year. Id.; see also Utah’s Top
Coal Producer, supra note 5.
67. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCING UTAH COAL 9
(May 2017), https://perma.cc/8TCG-RZCB.
68. Id.
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fund the Oakland Terminal’s development.69
However, before
development of the Terminal got off the ground, public outcry over news
of the Utah coal plan prompted the Oakland City Council to hold two public
hearings and hire an outside consultant to analyze the project’s health and
safety impacts.70 The City Council then approved an ordinance in 2016
which prohibited the storage and handling of coal at bulk goods facilities
in Oakland.71 The City also adopted a resolution applying the ban to
OBOT72 on the grounds that it was “necessary to prevent conditions
substantially dangerous to the health and/or safety of . . . adjacent
Neighbors.”73 OBOT quickly responded to Oakland’s ordinance with a
lawsuit claiming breach of contract, preemption by three federal laws
regulating rail transportation, and violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.74
Importantly, the district court’s ruling in Oakland was decided solely
on contractual grounds, as-applied, and not dormant Commerce Clause or
other federal preemption claims.75 The court found “the record before the
City Council [did] not contain substantial evidence that OBOT’s proposed
operations would pose a substantial danger to the health or safety of people
in Oakland,” which the contract required before the City could apply new
laws to the Terminal.76 The court then held that “the resolution applying
the coal ordinance to the OBOT facility is invalid.”77 Thus, the district
court did not invalidate the entire coal ban ordinance; it only invalidated
the application to OBOT, and only on contractual grounds, while expressly
leaving Oakland “free . . . to pursue future regulation of the project” after

69. Utah’s Top Coal Producer, supra note 5; see also Press Release, EARTHJUSTICE,
supra note 6.
70. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. at 990.
71. City of Oakland, California, Ordinance No. 13385 (July 19, 2016).
72. City of Oakland, California, Resolution No. 86234 (July 19, 2016).
73. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. at 991.
74. Id. The complaint alleged Oakland’s ordinance is preempted by the federal
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), the Hazardous Materials Act,
and the Shipping Act of 1984. Id.
75. See id. at 992 (declining to address the constitutional and federal preemption
claims by explaining it would be “unnecessary to adjudicate those potentially more weighty
questions if the case could be resolved on the breach of contract claim”).
76. Id. The health and safety finding by the City was necessary because the contract
precluded the application of most new laws to OBOT, but reserved the City’s right to apply
new laws if it “determines based on substantial evidence and after a public hearing that
failure to do so would place . . . adjacent neighbors . . . in a condition substantially dangerous
to their health or safety.” Id.
77. Id. at 1010.
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developing “a record that more carefully and thoroughly la[ys] out the
evidence.”78
In other words, although the district court’s contract-based decision is
on appeal in the Ninth Circuit,79 even if the City of Oakland loses that
appeal, the City still has the ability to apply its ban to OBOT in the future,
after developing additional evidence. Alternatively, if the Ninth Circuit
overturns the district court’s ruling on the contract issue, the case may get
remanded to the district court to consider OBOT’s alternative claim that the
City’s ban violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Part IV of this Article analyzes how a court might rule on OBOT’s dormant
Commerce Clause claim.
For now, however, Utah coal supporters should not feel emboldened
by the district court’s decision in Oakland because (as explained above) the
court’s holding was based on a fact-specific contract claim and, therefore,
it has limited applicability elsewhere. Moreover, because the district court
never reached the dormant Commerce Clause claim, this issue is still
unresolved and provides no precedent for industries making dormant
Commerce Clause claims elsewhere. However, one thing that is clear—
and in industries’ favor—from both the Oakland and Portland80 decisions
is that cities seeking to restrict fossil fuels will need to be more vigilant in
providing evidentiary bases for their ordinances.
E. Salt Lake City, Utah “Inland Port” Zoning Restrictions

While the Oakland, South Portland, and Longview, Washington
lawsuits were pending in federal district courts, and while the Oregon
Supreme Court was considering Portland’s petition for review, the Utah
Legislature passed a law in March 2018 that approves development of a
“Utah Inland Port” in Salt Lake City and West Valley81 with the objectives
of “facilitat[ing] the transportation of goods,” “coordinating trade-related
opportunities to export Utah products nationally and internationally,”
“connect[ing] local businesses to potential foreign markets for
exportation,” and being a “hub for trade combining rail, trucking, air cargo,
and other transportation.”82 This new state law required Salt Lake City to
adopt an ordinance by December 31, 2018, to allow “port uses,” and

78. Id. at 1009–1010.
79. OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018).
80. See supra notes 59, 76, and accompanying text.
81. See Utah Inland Port Authority Act, 2018 Utah Laws Ch. 179 (S.B. 234)
(codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-58-101–901 (West, Westlaw through 2019
General Sess.)).
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-58-203 (West, Westlaw through 2019 General Sess.).
92

6 - RACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/15/2019 3:50 PM

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2020

expressly barred the city from prohibiting “natural resources”83—a move
reportedly intended to avoid an Oakland-style coal ban.84
In compliance with the state’s mandate, Salt Lake City unanimously
adopted a zoning ordinance on December 4, 201885 that prohibits any
“extractive industry” or “refinery [of] petroleum products” from the Inland
Port Overlay District,86 but allows natural resources, coal, and crude oil,
with restrictions.87 Specifically, any “natural resource and bulk material
storage” facility larger than 500 square feet in area must be located at least
1,000 feet from a residential zone or state prison facility, and must be
contained within walls higher than the pile of materials, using “fugitive dust
control measures.”88 In addition, the “unloading, loading, transfer, or
temporary storage of coal, coal byproducts, and crude oil,” must be in “an
enclosed building,” or in a covered rail car, or in an open rail car where the
material has been “sprayed with surfactant to reduce dust,” and such
activity must be at least 1,000 feet from “environmentally sensitive
areas.”89 These standards contain an exception for “existing landfills” and
for when storage is “necessary for public safety purposes, such as the
storage of de-icing materials used on public streets.”90 As mentioned
above, no challenges to Salt Lake’s restrictions have surfaced yet,91 but this
Article hypothesizes how claims mirroring those in the two Portlands,
Oakland, or Longview cases could arise and how dormant Commerce
Clause claims could be resolved.

83. Id. at §§ 11-58-205(5), (6).
84. Taylor Anderson, Just Days Before a Planned Special Session to Fix Utah’s
Controversial Inland Port Bill, Negotiations Broke Down Between Governor and Salt Lake
Mayor, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/MKW8-4YC6 (quoting Utah
House Speaker Greg Hughes discussing how “too much control over the port by Salt Lake
City could . . . lead to political fighting over whether the region becomes an area for shipping
coal. Such a fight recently played out in Oakland, Calif., which tried to ban the shipment of
coal . . . .”).
85. Salt Lake City, Utah, Ordinance No. 69-18 of 2018, An Ordinance Amending
Various Sections of Title 21A of the Salt Lake City Code Pertaining to Regulation of Inland
Port Uses (codified at SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH CODE, § 21A.34.150 (Sterling Codifiers
through June 11, 2019)), https://perma.cc/5LLG-SHPK; see also Salt Lake City Council
Meeting Video (Dec. 4, 2018), https://slc.primegov.com/portal/Meeting?compiledMeet
ingDocumentId=7599 (unanimous vote, no discussion, at 1:04-1:05); see also Stevens,
supra note 18.
86. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (B)(2)(f) (Sterling Codifiers
through June 11, 2019).
87. Id. at § (E)(1)(a), (b).
88. Id. at § (E)(1)(b)).
89. Id. at § (E)(1)(b).
90. Id. at § (E)(1)(c), (d).
91. See supra Part I, at notes 20-21.
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III. Dormant Commerce Clause Parameters for Fossil Fuel
Handling Restrictions in Port Cities
The U.S. Supreme Court has long accepted that Congress’s
Constitutional power to “regulate Commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states”92 not only authorizes Congressional action, it also
impliedly “denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against
or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”93 This doctrine,
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, seeks to protect what the Court
has described as the Framers’ intent to avoid states (and their political
subdivisions, i.e., cities) from engaging in “economic Balkanization”94 or
“economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”95
However, the doctrine is tempered by the Court’s recognition that the
“Framers’ distrust of economic Balkanization was limited by their
federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy.”96 In other words, the
dormant Commerce Clause is not an absolute bar on all state and local
regulation touching interstate commerce. Rather, courts examine if a state
or local law offends the Commerce Clause using a four-pronged test.97 (A)
First, a state or local law that “discriminates” against interstate commerce
faces a “virtually per se rule of invalidity,”98 but may survive if it “serves a
legitimate local purpose” which “could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means.”99 (B) Conversely, if a law is nondiscriminatory
or “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public purpose,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”100 (C) Third, a law violates the
dormant Commerce Clause if it has an impermissible “extraterritorial”
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
93. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98
(1994); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (stating that the
Commerce Clause “limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate
commerce”).
94. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
95. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273.
96. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. V. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008).
97. This Article discusses all four potential prongs of the dormant Commerce Clause,
including the dormant foreign commerce clause, because all four have the potential to be
raised against local laws regulating the shipping and handling of fossil fuels at ports, as
evidenced by Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 296
(D. Me. 2018).
98. E.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
99. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citations omitted).
100. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
94
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reach.101 (D) Finally, a state or local law violates the dormant Commerce
Clause if it “interferes with the federal government’s ability to speak with
one voice when regulating commerce with foreign nations.”102 This Part
assesses the parameters of each prong using relevant Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals decisions, and how those parameters were correctly
applied in the Portland and South Portland cases.
A. Local Restrictions on Fossil Fuels are Not Inherently
Discriminatory

This Section discusses a threshold question in the four-pronged
dormant Commerce Clause analysis summarized immediately above.
Namely, this Section details how courts determine whether a state or local
law “discriminates” against interstate commerce and, further, how courts
have answered this question when examining fossil fuel restrictions,
including those in Portland and South Portland.
Whether a law “discriminates” against out-of-state commerce is a
threshold question because U.S. Supreme Court precedent holds that if a
state or local law does discriminate, then that law is unconstitutional unless
the government proves it “serves a legitimate local purpose, and . . . this
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.”103 Discrimination “means differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.”104 A law may be found discriminatory [1] “on its face or [2] in
practical effect,”105 or [3] if it has a “discriminatory purpose.”106

101. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). Courts and scholars have
questioned whether the test of “extraterritoriality” should be considered a test in and of itself
or whether it simply folds, or should fold, into the other two tiers. See Gellerson, supra note
36, at 569–70 (arguing that extraterritoriality should be folded into the Pike balancing test,
particularly for state regulations of electric power). Compare Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Cty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014) (using a “two-tiered approach”
to the dormant Commerce Clause, which did not include extraterritoriality), with Energy &
Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2015) (analyzing a Colorado
energy law under the extraterritoriality doctrine, while calling the doctrine the “most
dormant” of dormant Commerce Clause tests); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that California’s low carbon fuel standard
did not regulate extraterritorially).
102. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 296
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
103. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
104. E.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S.
93, 99 (1994).
105. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
106. Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984).
95
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This Section examines the parameters of these three kinds of
discrimination, specifically as applied to fossil fuel regulations. This
Section also highlights how Portland’s and South Portland’s fossil fuel
shipping ordinances were found by the courts to be nondiscriminatory
under all three kinds of discrimination. Finally, this Section concludes that
those rulings in Portland and South Portland were correct and in-line with
the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Later, Section B will explore how courts have easily upheld fossil fuel
regulations after finding them to be nondiscriminatory, but even a
discriminatory fossil fuel regulation could be upheld.
1.

Fossil fuel restrictions based on fuel type do not “facially
discriminate”

A state or local law is facially “discriminatory” under dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence if it treats products differently based on
state boundaries alone.107 On the flip-side, a local ordinance that “does not
distinguish between out-of-state and instate interests” is not facially
discriminatory.108 However, even if a local law does make geographic
distinctions, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey109 that such a law is only “discriminatory” when it is without “some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat [foreign and local products]
differently.”110 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted
this to mean that a law is “not facially discriminatory simply because it
affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”111 Rather, the Ninth

107. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99–100 (finding Oregon’s surcharge on disposal of
out-of-state waste “patently discriminates against interstate commerce,” where the fee
differential was based on geographic distinction alone, and the out-of-state waste was no
more harmful or costly than waste generated within the state).
108. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 300–
08 (D. Me. 2018) (relying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)), appeal
docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
109. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
110. Id. at 627 (holding that New Jersey’s law was facially discriminatory because it
barred out-of-state waste on the basis of geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste
posed no greater threat than in-state waste).
111. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2013).
The Supreme Court previously stated the “justification for[] a law has no bearing on whether
it is facially discriminatory,” and a law is discriminatory if it makes any “geographic
distinction.” Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100. However, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the
Supreme Court’s holdings accompanying such statements were based on situations in which
“no nondiscriminatory reason for the distinction was shown.” Rocky Mt. Farmers Union,
730 F.3d at 1089 (citing Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 n.5; Chem. Waste v. Hunt, 504
U.S. 334, 244 n.7 (1992)). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit extrapolated that a law with
locational differences is nondiscriminatory if “location affects actual emissions” and
“impose[s] higher costs.” Id. at 1089–90. Some scholars argue the Ninth Circuit erred in
96
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Circuit held in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey112 and American
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe113—both of which the
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review114—that a law with geographic
distinctions is nondiscriminatory if there is “some reason, apart from their
origin, to treat them differently.”115 Such reasons may include when outof-state products impose greater harm, and the state simply “recover[s] the
increased cost through a differential charge on [the] out-of-state”
product,116 so long as the difference is “calibrated to the actual risk
imposed.”117
In the context of fossil fuels, therefore, if “an out-of-state [fuel]
actually cause[s] more . . . emissions for each unit produced . . . [the state]
can base its regulatory treatment on these emissions.”118 Thus, a law that
makes in-state sales of some kinds of fuels “less attractive” is
nondiscriminatory so long as it “treats [fuels] by all producers the same way
based on the real risks posed” and “measures real differences in the harmful
effects” on the locality.119
Using the above principles, the Ninth Circuit held in Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard was not
“facially discriminatory” even though it used some locational factors to
calculate the fuels’ “Carbon Intensity” ratings, which made some out-ofstate fuels “less attractive” (while making some more economical) to sell

finding California’s Fuel Standard nondiscriminatory, but that the Fuel Standard could
nonetheless have survived strict scrutiny. Hwi Harold Lee, Dormant Commerce Clause
Review: Why the Ninth Circuit in Corey Strayed from Precedent and What the Supreme
Court Could have Done About It, 40 B.C. ENVT. AFF. L. REV. E. SUPP. 54, 64–65 (2015).
112. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089–91.
113. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 911–912 (9th Cir.
2018) (finding that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard was not facially discriminatory, based
on the precedent of Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1090), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2043 (2019).
114. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 573 U.S. 946 (2014) (denying cert. over
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard); Corey v. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 573 U.S. 947
(2014) (same); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014)
(same); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (denying cert.
over Oregon’s fuel standard).
115. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs., 903 F.3d at 911–912
(quoting Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27 (1978)).
116. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (citing Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101, n.5 (1994).
117. Id. (citing Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)).
118. Id. at 1090.
119. Id. at 1091–92.
97
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in California.120 The court reasoned that, even if out-of-state fuels had
different carbon ratings than their California counterparts and thus differing
costs of competing in the California market, such distinctions were based
on the “nondiscriminatory reason” that they “actually cause more
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”121 Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit
also upheld Oregon’s fuel standard in American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, finding the law was not facially discriminatory
because it distinguished between fuels based on “carbon intensity,” not
geographic origin.122
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine also found
the City of South Portland, Maine’s fossil fuel regulation to be
nondiscriminatory on its face in South Portland.123 However, the South
Portland ordinance did not test the boundaries of the dormant Commerce
Clause facial discrimination doctrine as far as the California and Oregon
fuel laws discussed in the preceding paragraph. Although South Portland’s
ordinance effectively barred the export of crude oil by ship from the city’s
port and also barred facilities that would support such exports, South
Portland’s ordinance—unlike the California and Oregon fuel standards—
made “no explicit mention of source, destination, or residency. Facially, it
binds local entities to the same extent as entities based . . . outside the
state.”124 Rather, South Portland’s ordinance “applies with equal force to
any entity seeking to load crude oil” in the regulated zones.”125 Therefore,
when the District of Maine held in South Portland held that the city’s
ordinance was “not facially discriminatory,”126 the court was well within
the dormant Commerce Clause bounds pushed by other circuits, namely the
Ninth Circuit.

120. Id. at 1083–1107. The rating system took into account a variety of factors from
production through consumption of the fuels, including shipping-related emissions,
efficiency of production, and the type of electricity used in production. “Credits” were given
to fuels with low Carbon Intensity ratings, and “deficits” were given to high Carbon
Intensity fuels. Although fuels with high Carbon Intensity ratings may still be sold in
California by purchasing carbon “credits,” the system makes it less economical for highcarbon fuels to participate. Id. at 1080. The Fuel Standard did not hurt all out-of-state fuels;
rather, some Midwest ethanols had the highest Carbon Intensity values, while others had the
lowest, and Brazilian ethanol had the lowest Carbon Intensity ratings. Id. at 1092–93.
121. Id. at 1089–90.
122. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 911–912 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019).
123. See Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264,
300 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
98
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In Portland, Oregon, facial discrimination was not even alleged, as
the ordinance there simply prohibits any new large fossil fuel terminal in
the city, regardless of the origins of the company or fuel.127 Nonetheless,
the Oregon court analyzed Portland’s ordinance against the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Philadelphia v. New Jersey128—a seminal facial
discrimination case—and concluded the ordinance did not discriminate
because it does not “bar fuel exports to or through Portland, but [rather]
place[s] restrictions on the size of certain fuel terminals that may be used
as export facilities.”129 Therefore, like the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine, the Oregon Court of Appeals here was well within
dormant Commerce Clause facial discrimination holdings of other courts.
2.

Fossil fuel restrictions do not have a “practical effect” of
discrimination if there is no competition between
substantially similar entities, nor if only local entities are
harmed, nor if differentiation is based on harm caused by
out-of-state products

As discussed above, a state or local law faces a presumption of
unconstitutionality under the dormant Commerce Clause if it
“discriminates” against out-of-state commerce on its face, in practical
effect, or in its purpose.130 This Subsection examines the parameters of the
second type of discrimination—“practical effect”—and how courts have
applied this test to fossil fuel regulations, including Portland’s and South
Portland’s ordinances on oil storing and shipping.
Absent facial discrimination, a local law may still be considered
discriminatory if it has the “practical effect” of excluding out-of-state
products from being sold in-state131 or “causes local goods to constitute a
larger share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a smaller
share, of the total sales in the market.”132 In other words, in order to prevail,
“the claimant must show both how local economic actors are favored by

127. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 261–63
(Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 2018 Ore. LEXIS 588 (Or. July 26, 2018).
128. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624–29 (holding that New Jersey’s
law was facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of
geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than in-state waste).
129. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 265.
130. See discussion supra at notes 103–106.
131. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (holding that a city
ordinance, which prohibited the sale of milk unless it was bottled within five miles of the
city square, “plainly discriminates against interstate commerce” because in “practical effect
[it] excludes from distribution in Madison wholesome milk produced and pasteurized [outof-state],” even though it also excluded milk from other distant in-state cities).
132. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978).
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the legislation, and how out-of-state actors are burdened.”133 An allegation
of discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause also requires a
“comparison of substantially similar entities” and “actual or prospective
competition between the supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a
single market.”134 Thus, “[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation
falls on some interstate companies [or types of companies] does not, by
itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”135
As referenced in the prior Subsection, the Ninth Circuit in Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union examined the degree to which California’s Low
Carbon Fuel Standard impacted similar in-state and out-of-state crude oil
producers. The court held that the Fuel Standard’s crude oil provisions did
not have a discriminatory “practical effect,” even though it partially
correlated oil production location with “carbon intensity” ratings, which
influences the in-state price.136 The court reasoned that the Fuel Standard
both benefitted and burdened various in-state fuels, and both benefitted and
burdened various out-of-state fuels.137 The Ninth Circuit subsequently
explained in American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers that Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union established that a fuel regulation “based on the
real risks posed” is “not a dormant Commerce Clause violation” and, under
that premise, held that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard did not
discriminate in effect.138
State and local laws may go even further than the California and
Oregon fuel standards described above and may outright exclude one kind

133. Eastern Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cty., Ky., 127 F.3d 532, 543 (6th
Cir. 1997).
134. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300 (1997).
135. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126; see also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d
1169, 1171–73 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding Colorado’s Renewable Portfolio Standard “does
not discriminate against out-of-staters” even though it “effectively means some out-of-state
coal producers . . . will lose business”).
136. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2013).
However, the court remanded the issue of “whether the Fuel Standard’s ethanol provisions
discriminate in purpose or in practical effect.” Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). On remand,
the district court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the discriminatory effects claim,
ruling that more information was needed on “how much ethanol the affected producers
import to California,” in order to “assess adequately the extent to which ethanol producers
are benefited or burdened” by the Fuel Standard. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258
F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1162–63 (E.D. Cal. 2017). However, that order was also based on an
allegation that California had changed its standards to artificially aid in-state fuels. Am.
Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (clarifying the basis for decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union).
137. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1099–1101.
138. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d at 914–915.
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of group or product without being deemed discriminatory.139 This was the
situation in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,140 where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a state law blocking all petroleum producers and
refiners from operating retail service stations in-state was not
discriminatory, even though 95% of the businesses blocked by the law were
out-of-state companies141 and even though “at least three refiners w[ould]
stop selling” gas in-state.142 The Court reasoned that the law did not
“distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail
market.”143 Rather, the law simply prohibited one particular kind of
business, retail service stations operated by petroleum producers or
refiners, which was allowable because the Commerce Clause does not
“protect[] the particular structure or methods of operation” of the interstate
market.144
Consistent with Exxon, the court in Portland, Oregon held that
Portland’s ordinance, which generally prohibits large “bulk fossil fuel
terminals,” did not have a discriminatory “practical effect” even though it
allowed exceptions for fuel terminals in “airports . . . retail gas stations, and
terminals built for distributors and wholesalers who receive and deliver fuel
solely by trucks.”145 The court concluded the ordinance does not “disfavor
out-of-state exporters when compared to ‘substantially similar’ in-state
exporters because there are no producers, refiners, or distributors in
Portland or Oregon, much less ones that export fuel to national or
international markets.”146 The court also rebuffed the plaintiff’s assertion
that the ordinance discriminates by “disfavor[ing] out-of-state sellers of
fossil-fuels” while “favor[ing] local, in-state purchasers and end users” via
“exceptions for facilities that serve local end users of fuel.”147 Out-of-state
exporters, the court explained, are not “substantially similar entities” to in139. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–29 (1978) (explaining that
New Jersey could legitimately pursue its goal of preventing the environmental harms caused
by waste by “slowing the flow of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills, even though
interstate commerce may be incidentally affected,” but holding that New Jersey’s law was
facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of geographic origin
alone, and the out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than waste generated in-state. The
law was facially discriminatory because the state could not show “some reason, apart from
origin, to treat them differently.”).
140. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
141. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, dissenting).
142. Id. at 127 (majority).
143. Id. at 126.
144. Id. at 127.
145. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 262 (Or.
Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018).
146. Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125).
147. Id. at 264.
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state end users, and thus no comparison could be made for a dormant
Commerce Clause discrimination claim.148
Similarly, in South Portland, Maine, the court correctly held that the
City’s ordinance—which prohibits the loading of crude oil onto tankers and
bars the construction of supporting facilities—was not “discriminatory in
practical effect.”149 The court reasoned that there were “no direct [out-ofstate] competitors to suffer a relative disadvantage” because there were no
local producers or shippers who could benefit.150 Further, the court
continued, “the entities most directly harmed [a pipeline company and a
tugboat company] by the practical effects of the Ordinance are in-state,
local businesses.”151 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
ordinance had the “practical effect of completely blocking flows of crude
oil from Canada.”152 Instead, the court found South Portland’s ordinance
did not impact several major sources of Canadian oil entering the city and,
even if it did have an impact, such an argument “stretches the dormant
Commerce Clause too far” and would be contrary to Exxon.153 The court
held that, “in a modern globalized economy,” the fact that “commerce in a
market originates in another state or country does not mean that otherwise
evenhanded regulations or prohibitions on that market automatically have
the ‘practical effect’ of discriminating against interstate or foreign
commerce.”154
In sum, the reasoning of the District of Maine in South Portland and
the Oregon Court of Appeals in Portland is well-supported by U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in Exxon. Therefore, South Portland and
Portland were correct to conclude that the fossil fuel shipping and storing
ordinances at issue did not discriminate in effect.
3.

Fossil fuel restrictions do not have a discriminatory
purpose when primarily based on environmental or
health concerns

The third kind of dormant Commerce Clause “discrimination”
examined by some courts—including the district court in South Portland—
is “discriminatory purpose.”155 Courts often recite that strict scrutiny under

148. Id.
149. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 300–
01 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 301.
152. Id. at 302.
153. Id. at 302–03.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 303–08.
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the dormant Commerce Clause is triggered if a state or local law has a
“discriminatory purpose.”156 However, courts rarely strike down a law
based on “discriminatory purpose” alone.157 This has led some courts,
including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maine in South Portland, to “question
whether a showing of discriminatory purpose alone will invariably suffice
to support a finding of constitutional invalidity under the dormant
Commerce Clause.”158 Some courts omit the “discriminatory purpose” test
altogether, as the court in Portland, Oregon did.159
When courts do use the discriminatory purpose test, many have taken
a restrained approach. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pike v.
Bruce Church held that a lower level of scrutiny applies where the “primary
purpose” is nondiscriminatory, and the “effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental.”160 Citing Pike, the First Circuit held that heightened
scrutiny is not triggered if the “potential discriminatory purpose [is] lurking
in the background, [and] that purpose [is], at most, incidental to the primary
purposes.”161
In the context of environmental laws reviewed by the Supreme Court,
a purported environmental purpose will not save a law from being deemed
“discriminatory” if the law burdens only out-of-state products that pose no
greater environmental or health risk than in-state products. 162 On the other
156. E.g., Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984).
157. Courts that have overturned state or local laws on the basis of the law’s
discrimination have not often done so without a finding of discriminatory effect or facial
discrimination. See id. at 268–71 (holding that a Hawaiian law exempting locally produced
beverages from an alcohol tax that applied to non-local beverages had the discriminatory
“purpose” of “aid[ing] Hawaiin industry” and also “seems clearly to discriminate on its
face” and had the “effect” of discrimination); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351–52 (1977) (noting “some indications” of intentional
discrimination but holding the North Carolina law was discriminatory based on its
“discriminatory impacts” or “effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry
the competitive and economic advantages it has earned . . . .”). Indeed, the Supreme Court
noted that “the principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute . . .
judged chiefly in terms of [its] probable effects.” Lewis v. Bt Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27,
37 (1980) (emphases added).
158. All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 36 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005); City of
South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (citing All. of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 36 n.3).
159. See, e.g., City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 263 (explaining that the dormant
Commerce Clause discrimination test is whether a law discriminates “on its face or in
practical effect”).
160. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
161. All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2005).
162. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (rejecting an argument that
economic protectionism was evidenced by a government statement that Maine’s money
would be better “spent at home” on “home-grown bait”). For example, in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the Court held that a New Jersey law, which had the
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hand, where a law is designed to curtail fossil fuels that pose a greater
environmental harm than other products, the Ninth Circuit has held that
such laws do not have a discriminatory or “protectionist purpose;” rather,
they are “genuinely proposed for environmental reasons,” even if some of
the law’s supporters promote the law’s local economic benefits.163
For example, the Ninth Circuit held in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union that
the crude oil restrictions in California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard did not
have a discriminatory purpose, even though they were designed to
“promote the development of alternative fuels rather than to encourage . . .
crude oil” and the restrictions partially correlated with location.164
Moreover, the district court on remand also found the Fuel Standard’s
ethanol provisions did not have a “protectionist purpose,” even though a
state agency press release touted that “[p]roduction of fuels within the state
will also keep consumer dollars local by reducing the need to make fuel
purchases from beyond its borders.”165 The court found that, at most, the
statement was an “economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely proposed
for environmental reasons.”166 The Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion when examining Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard and
statements by Oregon’s governor touting the law’s local economic
benefits.167 These holdings are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Maine v. Taylor, where the Court upheld Maine’s ban on certain
out-of-state fish and rejected an argument that economic protectionism was

purpose of protecting the state’s environment, health and safety, was facially discriminatory,
not because of the law’s environmental purpose, but because it expressly barred only outof-state waste, which posed no greater risk than in-state waste. The Court acknowledged
that “slowing the flow of all waste” would be permissible under a long line of cases
upholding quarantine laws that blocked “noxious” products at state borders. Id. at 627–29.
163. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070, 1100 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that an “economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely proposed for environmental
reasons” is not evidence of a “discriminatory purpose”); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs.
v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding
that statements by state government officials promoting the local economic benefits of the
law “do not plausibly relate to a discriminatory design and are easily understood, in context,
as economic defense of a regulation genuinely proposed for environmental reasons”); see
also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
(dismissing the assertion that discriminatory purpose was evidenced by a government
statement that an environmental law would help “keep consumer dollars local”).
164. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1085, 1099–1101.
165. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156.
166. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1100 n.13
(quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n. 7 (1981))).
167. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs., 903 F.3d at 912.
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evidenced by a government statement saying Maine’s money would be
better “spent at home” on “home-grown bait.”168
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine in South
Portland correctly held that that the City’s ordinance did not have a
discriminatory effect, where the ordinance’s “primary purpose” was
nondiscriminatory, despite its design to block a specific kind of product
(crude oil) that happened to come from out-of-state.169 The court ruled as
such despite some private supporters of the law encouraging “stop[ping]
out-of-state big oil” or “Canadian oil,” and one Councilmember proposing
(but not receiving support) to include a distinction between American and
Canadian oil.170 Instead, the court found the “handful of anti-Canadian
comments and references to out-of-state interests . . . falls short of
establishing that the Ordinance’s primary purpose was to disfavor out-ofstate competitors or to favor in-state competitors” when viewed in context
of the “voluminous record” demonstrating the City’s focus on community’s
“health and safety,” and “air quality, water quality, aesthetics, and
redevelopment risks of crude oil loading in general.”171
In sum, the result and reasoning in South Portland is consistent with
the First Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court precedents discussed in
the preceding paragraphs. Moreover, these decisions demonstrates that, to
the extent that local laws must be subjected to a “discriminatory purpose”
test under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, fossil fuel restrictions
with genuine and primary environmental and health purposes are not
discriminatory in purpose, even if some of the law’s supporters tout
purposes that could be considered discriminatory or protectionist.
However, the decisions discussed in this Subsection have also
demonstrated that the “discriminatory purpose” test may no longer be
necessary and, therefore, the Oregon Court of Appeals was not out-of-line
when it ignored this issue altogether.
B. Fossil Fuel Restrictions can Withstand the Pike Test and
Strict Scrutiny

The preceding Section demonstrated how fossil fuel regulations can
be found “non-discriminatory” under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
and how the courts in Portland and South Portland correctly found the

168. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (quoting United States v. Taylor,
752 F.2d 757, 760 (1st Cir. 1985)) (the Court in Maine v. Taylor found that Maine’s law
was facially discriminatory but did not find the law had a discriminatory purpose, and the
Court ultimately upheld Maine’s law under a strict scrutiny standard).
169. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 303–
04 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 304.
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fossil fuel handling and storing ordinances in those cases to be
nondiscriminatory.172 This Section discusses the next step in a court’s
dormant Commerce Clause analysis—determining what level of judicial
scrutiny applies and whether the law at issue can withstand that scrutiny.
If a state or local law does not “discriminate” against out-of-state
commerce, but rather “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”173 Local and
“[s]tate laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny,”174 including the fossil
fuel restrictions in South Portland, Maine175 and Portland, Oregon.176 In
contrast to the relatively light scrutiny placed on nondiscriminatory laws,
there is a “virtually per se rule of invalidity”177 for discriminatory laws.
Even so, discriminatory laws may still survive if they “serve[] a legitimate
local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means,” even if the risks are “imperfectly understood”
and even if the proposed solution would not be a “complete success.”178
Therefore, if a court rules consistently with the prior Section’s
premise that local restrictions on fossil fuel handling and storing should
generally be deemed nondiscriminatory, those restrictions can typically
survive the Pike test. However, even if a court found a local restriction on
fossil fuel handling and storing to be discriminatory, this Section argues
that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Maine v. Taylor may nevertheless
allow the local law’s survival.179
In Maine v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a facially
discriminatory law may survive strict scrutiny where the state seeks to
“guard[] against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the
possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible.”180 In
supporting its rare decision to uphold a facially discriminatory law—which
172. See infra Section III.A.
173. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
174. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (citing Pike, 397 U.S.
137); see also Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 916 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard
survived the Pike test in “in light of the substantial state interest in mitigating the
environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions …”).
175. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 308.
176. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018).
177. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
178. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138–51 (1986) (citations omitted).
179. For a similar argument made with respect to California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, see Lee, supra note 111, at 65.
180. Maine, 477 U.S. at 148.
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banned the importation of live baitfish from other states—the Court
reasoned that Maine’s desire to protect its fisheries from parasites and nonnative species was a “legitimate interest.”181 Further, there was no nondiscriminatory means to achieve this goal because “there was no
satisfactory way to inspect shipments of live baitfish for parasites or
commingled species.”182 The Court explained that the “commerce clause
cannot be read as requiring [a state] to sit idly by and wait until potentially
irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . . before it acts to avoid
such consequences.”183 Therefore, Maine v. Taylor paved the way for
courts to uphold local fossil fuel shipping and handling bans against
dormant Commerce Clause challenges when those bans aim to combat
“irreversible environmental damage,” such as long-term human health
effects and climate change, and there is no feasible or “satisfactory way”
besides a ban to achieve that goal. For example, the overwhelming risk of
climate change or the long-term human health risks of fine particulate
matter—which governments, health organizations, courts, and the trucking
industry alike concede is harmful at any level184—could be deemed the kind
of irreversible environmental harm which nothing less than a ban would
satisfactorily address.
Even though Portland, Oregon and South Portland, Maine were
decided under the Pike balancing test, the courts arguably could have
reached the same conclusions under a strict scrutiny standard, using the
logic of Maine v. Taylor. For example, in South Portland, the court held
that the City’s ordinance prohibiting crude oil loading did “not impose
burdens on foreign and interstate commerce that are clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”185 The court found that although the
ordinance “creates meaningful burdens on interstate and foreign
commerce,”186 it also created “ample and weighty local benefits” by
addressing “air emissions-related public health risks” for adjacent
“sensitive locations, such as schools,” as well as noise, odor, and other
environmental risks from loading crude oil.187 As evidence of the
significant risks imposed by the project, the court was influenced by the
fact that the American Lung Association gave the county a “C” air quality
grade, even though the state’s Department of Environmental Protection

181. Id. at 150.
182. Id. at 141.
183. Id. at 148.
184. See infra notes 273-274 and accompanying discussion.
185. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 308
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
186. Id. at 309.
187. Id. at 310.
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found the air quality to be acceptable.188 In addition, because the court was
persuaded by the unrebutted testimony that “there is no safe level of
exposure to many of the air pollutants that would be emitted,”189 lessrestrictive means would not achieve the city’s goal of protecting air quality.
The court rebuffed the plaintiff’s assertion that the ordinance’s benefits
were inflated because it does not address other sources of local pollution.
Instead, the South Portland court said that “a legislature need not strike at
all evils at the same time or in the same way, and [] a legislature may . . .
adopt[] regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil,”190
echoing the Maine v. Taylor holding that a local law need not guarantee
“complete success.”191
Likewise, in Portland, Oregon, the court’s ruling in the city’s favor
purportedly relied on Pike deference—finding the plaintiff had not proven
that an absence of large fossil fuel terminals in the city would excessively
burden interstate commerce.192 And, like in South Portland, the Portland
decision could also be upheld under the scrutiny of Maine v. Taylor. The
court in Portland, Oregon recognized that the City’s ordinance would
provide “legitimate putative local benefits which include limiting the
number of very large fossil fuel terminals in a moderate-to-high earthquake
liquefaction zone,” as well as “reduc[ing] the risk of potential explosions,
accidents, and fire at large fossil fuel terminal,” and “reduc[ing] the similar
risk of catastrophic accident from the larger trains that transport fossil fuels
to the terminals.”193 Opponents could maybe argue that seismic safety
goals could be achieved through other technological means and therefore
the ordinance should not survive strict scrutiny. However, it’s unclear if
such technology exists or would be less restrictive than Portland’s simpler
size-based restriction.
In sum, while the specific outcome will be fact-dependent, Maine v.
Taylor, Portland, and South Portland demonstrate that there is room for
bans on fossil fuel shipping, handling, and storing to survive a strict
scrutiny dormant Commerce Clause test.

188. Id. at 312.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466
(1981)).
191. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
192. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 267 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018).
193. Id. at 266.
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C. Restrictions on Handling and Storing Fossil Fuels Do Not
Regulate “Extraterritorially”

Some challengers to state and local fossil fuel restrictions—including
the plaintiffs in Portland and South Portland—have argued that such laws
violate the doctrine against extraterritoriality.194 A law is per se invalid
under the “extraterritoriality” doctrine if the law, “either by its express
terms or by its inevitable effect,”195 “control[s] commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a State”196 or “project[s] its legislation” into
another state.197 Because the Supreme Court has “rarely held that statutes
violate the extraterritoriality doctrine,”198 scholars have observed that the
“contours of the doctrine” are not “fully articulated” and are “unsettled and
poorly understood,” leading to inconsistent interpretation among lower
courts. 199 Therefore, the applicability of the extraterritoriality doctrine to
port fossil fuel restrictions is best understood through a series of case
examples.
The Tenth Circuit—in an opinion authored by now Supreme Court
Justice Gorsuch—upheld Colorado’s Renewable [Energy] Portfolio
Standard200 against a challenge under the extraterritoriality prong of the
dormant Commerce Clause, despite the fact that the law “effectively means
some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business.”201 The court in

194. Id. at 265; Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d
264, 292–92 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
195. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003) (finding
that a Maine statute that placed requirements on drug manufactures, but not on pharmacies,
did not extraterritorially regulate when it did “not regulate the price of any out-of-state
transaction . . . . Maine does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler
for a certain price,” nor did it tie “the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices,”
nor could a manufacturer “avoid its rebate obligation by opening production facilities in
Maine . . . .”).
196. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (striking down a Connecticut
law that required in-state beer prices to be no higher than out-of-state prices, which had the
effect of controlling prices outside of the state).
197. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (invalidating a New
York law that extended its minimum milk prices beyond its borders by forbidding the instate sale of milk that was purchased out-of-state below the minimum price). But, as
explained above in note 101, courts sometimes treat extraterritoriality as branch under the
strict scrutiny/discrimination branch, rather than its own branch.
198. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013); see
also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) (calling the
extraterritoriality doctrine the “most dormant” of dormant Commerce Clauses tests).
199. Gellerson, supra note 36, at 569, 580.
200. The Renewable Portfolio Standard “requires electricity generators to ensure that
20 percent of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable
sources.” Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015).
201. Id. at 1171.
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Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel held that the extraterritoriality doctrine
only applies where “three essential characteristics” are present: “(1) a price
control or price affirmation regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to those
charged elsewhere, with (3) the effect of raising costs for out-of-state
consumers or rival businesses.”202 The court concluded that these elements
were not met, because the Standard did not “blatantly” regulate price, nor
did it “discriminate” against out-of-state consumers or producers, even
though it could have “ripple effects, including price effects, both in-state
and elsewhere,” and “hurt” fossil fuel businesses.203 The court reasoned
that Colorado’s law “does not discriminate”204 because it would equally
harm all fossil fuel producers and equally help all renewable energy
producers, regardless of location.205 The court also cautioned against
“overinclusion” in applying the extraterritoriality doctrine, warning that “if
any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se
unconstitutional,” the court would “have to strike down state health and
safety regulations that require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their
designs or labels[.]”206
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard was not an “extraterritorial regulation,” because it only applied to
fuels consumed in-state and was “properly based . . . on the harmful
properties of fuel.”207 The court reasoned that “[t]he Commerce Clause
does not protect [a business’s] ability to make others pay for the hidden
harms of their products merely because those products are shipped across
state lines.”208 Moreover, even if California had the “goal of influencing
the out-of-state choices of market participants,” it was free to do so by
“regulat[ing] commerce and contracts within [its] boundaries.”209 The
court found that California’s Fuel Standard did not impose mandates on
“wholly out-of-state transactions.”210 Rather, the Fuel Standard allowed
businesses “in any location [to] elect to respond to the incentives,” without
requiring businesses to “meet a particular carbon intensity standard” (they
could purchase carbon credits to meet the standard), and without requiring
any jurisdiction to “adopt a particular regulatory standard for its producers

202. Id. at 1173.
203. Id. at 1173–74.
204. Id. at 1173.
205. Id. at 1174.
206. Id. at 1175.
207. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013).
208. Id. at 1106.
209. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added) (citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. Walsh,
538 U.S. 644, 679 (2003)).
210. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1101.
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to gain access to California.”211 Further, the Fuel Standard “makes no effort
to ensure the price of [fuel] is lower in California than in other states.”212
On these same grounds, the Ninth Circuit also recently found Oregon’s low
carbon fuel standard did not regulate extraterritorially.213
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court ruling
overturning a Minnesota law, which had essentially banned new coal
generation in the state’s electricity market.214 The district court had found
Minnesota’s law was unconstitutional on the grounds that it was
extraterritorial regulation.215 However, only one out of three judges on the
panel found the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause, while the
other two found the law was preempted by federal statutes.216 Further, one
of the judges disagreed with the overly broad application of the
extraterritoriality doctrine, explaining that there is a “distinction between
[impermissible] wholly extraterritorial regulation and [permissible]
regulations which apply to out of state companies entering into commerce
within a state,” and concluding that the law did not control conduct wholly
outside of the state.217 Therefore, the Eight Circuit’s splintered decision
should not be seen as a gateway to expansive use of the extraterritoriality
doctrine against environmental laws.
Consistent with the Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions described
above, the court in Portland, Oregon concluded that Portland’s ordinance
limiting the size of fossil fuel terminals did “not regulate the conduct of
out-of-state consumers in Oregon, nor do they regulate out-of-state
consumers’ conduct in their states.”218 Likewise, the South Portland,
Maine court held that the City’s ordinance “prohibit[ing] crude oil within
the boundaries of certain districts in the City” was not an extraterritorial
regulation because “[c]onduct is not controlled by the Ordinance if it occurs

211. Id.
212. Id. at 1103.
213. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 916–917 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019).
214. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016).
215. Id. at 913–914 (discussing North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 919
(D. Minn. 2014)); see also Gellerson, supra note 36, at 589–90 (describing North Dakota v.
Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016)).
216. See North Dakota, 825 F.3d at 913 (Loken, J.); id. at 924 (Murphy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (asserting the law is preempted by the
Federal Power Act); id. 927 (Colloton, J., concurring in judgement) (asserting the state law
conflicts with the Clean Air Act); see also Gellerson, supra note 36, at 590–593.
217. North Dakota, 825 F.3d at 925 (Murphy, J. concurring in part and concurring
in judgement).
218. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018) (the court did not expressly use the term
“extraterritoriality”).
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outside . . . South Portland’s Shipyard, Commercial, and Industrial
districts.”219 Further, petroleum companies “would not be subject to
inconsistent obligations if other localities passed similar statutes . . . .
[T]here would simply be a smaller list of potential sites for loading crude
oil.”220 Moreover, even though the likely “effect of [South Portland’s]
Ordinance is to influence . . . infrastructure outside the City” because it
could hurt the plaintiff’s ability to obtain financing for a pipeline, the court
concluded “that does not mean the Ordinance regulates
extraterritorially.”221 In reasoning reminiscent of Justice Gorsuch’s
warning against “overinclusion,”222 the South Portland court cautioned
against using extraterritorial effect to strike down laws, because if effect
alone were enough, then “in the modern age of highly interconnected
commerce, there would be virtually no room for local historic police
powers.”223
In sum, the bounds and applicability of the extraterritoriality doctrine
are ill-defined. But to the extent that challengers to a port fossil fuel ban
raise extraterritoriality concerns, Portland and South Portland, as well as
the Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases discussed above, demonstrate that courts
have room to conclude such bans do impermissibly regulate
extraterritorially.
D. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause

An additional dormant Commerce Clause issue in the context of port
communities restricting fossil fuels is that of the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause, or the “federal government’s ability to speak with one
voice when regulating commerce with foreign governments.”224 Plaintiffs

219. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 297
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015)
(warning that “if any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se
unconstitutional, wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that
require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?”).
223. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
224. Id. at 314–15 (citing e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434,
449 (1979)).
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raised this issue in Oakland225 and the Longview, Washington case,226 and
the court addressed this issue in South Portland, Maine.227
In South Portland, the court concluded the city’s ordinance did not
“interfere with the government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ when
regulating foreign commerce or impair[] uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential.”228 Despite the fact that the ordinance
barred mostly Canadian-oil, the ordinance did “not explicitly target any
foreign countries.”229 Further, “[e]ven if enacted in many other
jurisdictions, there will be no inconsistent burdens” or “perplexing
disuniformity, it is simply unfavorable uniformity.”230 The court reasoned
that “[a]ny local regulation or prohibition on a large and important industry
will inevitably touch on federal commerce in a broad sense, given the
realities of a modern globalized society,” and the mere fact that an
ordinance has “foreign resonances because it impacts a piece of crossborder infrastructure and a large industry” does not put it in conflict with
the Commerce Clause.231
Therefore, just as South Portland demonstrated that local bans on
fossil fuel handling, storing, and shipping can survive dormant Commerce
Clause tests for discrimination and extraterritorially, it also demonstrated
that such bans can survive dormant foreign Commerce Clause Challenges.

IV. Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s Ordinances are Well
within the Bounds of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence
The previous Part of this Article demonstrated that local restrictions
on fossil fuel handling at ports are not inherently discriminatory, do not
inherently regulate extraterritoriality, do not impermissibly regulate foreign
commerce, and could survive a stricter scrutiny test. Part IV now applies
this precedent to the ordinances in Oakland, California and Salt Lake City,

225. Complaint at ¶¶10, 130, 132, 158, 166, Oakland, Oakland Bulk & Oversized
Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No.
3:16-vc-07014-MEJ), appeal docketed, OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir.
filed June 20, 2018).
226. Complaint at ¶¶224-239, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018) (claiming relief under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, alleging the state discriminated against the plaintiff’s “efforts to export
coal to their Asian customers” and created “substantial risk of conflict with foreign
governments”).
227. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 313–14.
228. Id. at 316.
229. Id. at 314.
230. Id. at 315.
231. Id. at 315–316.
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Utah, and concludes that both fit comfortably within the bounds of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
A. Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s Ordinances are Not
Discriminatory on Their Face, In Effect, or In Purpose

This Section subjects Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s ordinances to
the three tests of dormant Commerce Clause discrimination discussed in
Part III—discrimination on the face of the law, in-effect, and in purpose—
and concludes these ordinance are nondiscriminatory under each test.
1.

Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances are not
“facially discriminatory”

Applying the principles of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,232 Portland,
Oregon,233 and South Portland, Maine,234 the ordinances in Oakland and
Salt Lake do not facially discriminate. Salt Lake City’s ordinance does not
base its natural resources restrictions on geographic origin, but rather on
the size of storage area, type of fuel, or type of industry or product.235 This
echoes—albeit in a much less-restrictive way—Portland, Oregon’s
ordinance barring fossil fuel facilities over a certain size.236 Similarly,
Oakland’s ordinance does not prohibit coal from a specific locality, but
rather prohibits coal from any location from being stored or handled “at
bulk goods facilities in Oakland.”237 This mirrors South Portland, Maine’s
prohibition on crude oil loading in certain city zones.238 Therefore, courts
examining Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s ordinances should follow the
logic of the two Portland cases and find no facial discrimination, because
the ordinances apply “with equal force to any entity seeking to load [coal
or crude oil]” in the regulated zones and they “bind[] local entities to the

232. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624–29 (holding that New Jersey’s
law was facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of
geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than in-state waste).
233. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 263 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018); see also supra Part III.A.1.
234. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264; see also supra Part III.A.1.
235. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(E)(1) (Sterling Codifiers through
June 11, 2019) (placing restrictions on “natural resource and bulk material storage in excess
of five hundred (500) square feet in area”); id. at § (E)(1)(b) (placing more restrictions on
the coal, coal byproducts, and crude oil); id. at § (B)(2)(f) (prohibiting any extractive
industry, waste incinerator, hazardous waste storage or processor, refinery of petroleum
products).
236. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 263.
237. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d
986, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018).
238. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 282–84.
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same extent as entities based . . . outside the state.”239 Further, even if the
Oakland and Salt Lake ordinances did place more restrictions on fossil fuels
coming from out-of-state, it is still possible for a court to apply the Ninth
Circuit’s standard and find no discrimination, so long as the out-of-state
fuels impose greater harm on the city than locally produced fuels, and the
additional restrictions are proportional to the harm.240
2.

Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances arguably do
not discriminate in effect, but more facts are needed

Applying the principles of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,241
Portland, Oregon, and South Portland, Maine, a court should find that
Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances do not discriminate in practical
effect. In Oakland, the plaintiff’s complaint has the same two flaws as the
complaints in Portland and South Portland: (1) a lack of competition
between substantially similar in-state and out-of-state entities; and (2)
alleged harm only to local entities.242
First, the Oakland ordinance does not discriminate between
substantially similar in-state and out-of-state entities. The Oakland
plaintiff claims that the City’s ordinance discriminates against “out-of-state
miners, shippers, customers, and carriers of coal . . . while protecting instate interests by banning the transportation of coal . . . and simultaneously
exempting from the ban certain local, non-commercial and on-site
manufacturing operations within Oakland that handle, store, and/or
consume coal.”243 Similar to the exemptions in Portland, Oregon’s
ordinance,244 the local consumers exempted from the Oakland ban are not
“substantially similar entities” to the out-of-state miners, shippers, or
carriers allegedly harmed.245

239. Id. at 300.
240. Am. Fuel &Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (finding Oregon’s fuel standard was not facially
discriminatory); see Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding California’s Fuel Standard was not facially discriminatory, where
differential treatment of local and nonlocal fuel was based on carbon intensity).
241. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
242. See City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 300–03; see also City of Portland,
412 P.3d at 262.
243. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶131, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v.
City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th
Cir. filed June 20, 2018) (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC).
244. See City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 264 (holding that “sellers” and “users” of fossil
fuels are not “substantially similar entities” for a dormant Commerce Clause comparison).
245. The facilities exempted in Oakland’s ban include: “(i) Non-commercial
facilities (e.g. educational facilities or residential property on which persons may Store or
Handle small amounts of Coal or Coke for personal, scientific, recreational, or incidental
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Second, Oakland’s ordinance only allegedly harms local entities. The
harm claimed in Oakland is the loss of money by the defendant (City of
Oakland) and by the plaintiff, which is a California corporation.246
Therefore, as the South Portland court concluded, “[t]he Ordinance cannot
be said to favor in-state commercial interests at the expense of out-of-state
competitors when the entities most directly harmed by the practical effects
of the Ordinance are in-state, local businesses.”247 Further, the Oakland
plaintiff’s allegation of harm to out-of-state customers, as well as harm
alleged to out-of-state producers, is undermined by the fact that “18 months
after the Ordinance was enacted, the coal trains that ran through Oakland
before then [to the neighboring Port of Richmond] have continued to do
so.”248 Moreover, even if there was harm to out-of-state coal producers, the
ordinance applies equally to coal from any location. As the court in South
Portland, Maine noted, the fact that “commerce in a market originates in
another state or country does not mean that otherwise evenhanded
regulations or prohibitions on that market automatically have the ‘practical
effect’ of discriminating against interstate or foreign commerce.”249
Therefore, like in South Portland, a court has ample room to find that
Oakland’s ordinance does not discriminate in-effect.
Similarly, for Salt Lake City’s ordinance, challengers would have a
difficult time overcoming the fact that the entities most likely to be directly
economically harmed by the City’s standards on coal, crude oil, and
extractive industries250 are Utah-based companies. In fact, the State of
Utah’s official objectives for the Utah Inland Port include fostering the
“export [of] Utah products” and “connect[ing] local businesses to potential
foreign markets for exportation.”251 Challengers could argue that the
ordinance might disproportionately burden out-of-state purchasers as
compared to in-state purchasers, because Utah products going through the
Inland Port are likely intended for out-of-state markets—such as those in
Oakland, California or Longview, Washington—whereas Utah products
use) and (ii) on-site manufacturing facilities where all of the Coal or Coke is consumed onsite at that facility’s location and used on-site as an integral component in a production
process . . . .” City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.040(C) (July 20, 2016).
246. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶14, ¶122, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal,
LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC).
247. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 301.
248. Intervenor-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, Document 156 at
14:10-19, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv07014-VC) (citing the Declaration of OBOT’s owner, Mr. Tagami).
249. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 302.
250. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE §§ 21A.34.150(E)(1)(b), B(2)(f) (Sterling
Codifiers through June 11, 2019).
251. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-58-203 (West, Westlaw through 2019 General Session)
(emphases added).
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going to in-state markets may be less likely to travel through the Inland Port
and thus would not be impacted by the Ordinance. Challengers may also
point to the Ordinance’s exemption for “[t]he outdoor storage of bulk
materials necessary for safety purposes, such as the storage of de-icing
materials used on public streets”252 as a benefit to purely local consumers.
However, it is uncertain if the specific kinds of in-state and out-ofstate purchasers that a challenger to Salt Lake City’s ordinance might
discuss would be “substantially similar” for a dormant Commerce Clause
comparison.253 And, even if those purchasers were substantially similar,
challengers would need to prove Salt Lake’s ordinance caused Utah coal to
become more expensive out-of-state. Given that Utah coal can simply
circumvent the Inland Port to ship to out-of-state markets, which it
currently does,254 it is unclear if the City’s restrictions would result in any
differences between in-state and out-of-state prices of Utah coal and if a
price differential would be anything other than a permissible “incidental”
effect of an otherwise “evenhanded[]” law,255 “based on the real risks
posed.”256 Therefore, depending on the specific facts, a court may follow
South Portland’s conclusion that challenges to Salt Lake City’s ordinance
“stretch[] the dormant Commerce Clause too far.”257
3.

Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances are properly
based on environmental health concerns and do not
have a discriminatory purpose

A court should almost certainly find that Oakland’s or Salt Lake
City’s ordinances do not have a discriminatory purpose, in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Maine v. Taylor and the Ninth Circuit rulings
on California’s and Oregon’s low carbon fuel standards.258 These decisions
demonstrate that laws which are designed to curtail a harmful product do
252. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(E)(1)(c) (Sterling Codifiers
through June 11, 2019).
253. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 297-303 (1997) (holding that
natural gas “bundled with [. . .] services and protections” and sold to local consumers by
utilities did not compete with “unbundled” natural gas sold by independent marketers to
high-volume industrial buyers).
254. ADVANCING UTAH COAL, supra note 68, at 9 (“14.6 percent of Utah’s [coal]
production went to other states and roughly 5 percent went to foreign countries” in 2015).
255. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
256. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 914–17 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard did
not discriminate in effect because different treatment between in-state and out-of-state fuels
was based on carbon intensity, not geography).
257. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 302
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
258. See supra Part III.A.3.
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not have a discriminatory purpose if proposed for environmental reasons,
even if some of the laws’ supporters promote the local economic benefits,
unless other clearly discriminatory factors are present.259
The express purpose of Oakland’s ordinance is to “address the unique
and peculiar health, safety, and/or other impacts of Coal” in a community
that has “populations most vulnerable to health impacts from air
pollutants.”260 These goals and concerns were echoed by community
groups.261 Likewise, the express purpose of Salt Lake City’s ordinance is
to “facilitate[] regional, national, and international trade,” while also
aiming to be a “model to the nation for sustainable development,”
“respect[] and maintain[] sensitivity to the natural environment,” “help[] to
achieve City and State goals for air and water quality,” and “avoid,
minimize, manage, and mitigate detrimental environmental impacts.”262
The public263 and the local school district264 have echoed environmental and
health concerns over the Inland Port that Salt Lake’s ordinance was

259. See Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. 903 F.3d at 912 (statements by state
officials promoting the local economic benefits of the law “do not plausibly relate to a
discriminatory design and are easily understood, in context, as economic defense of a
regulation genuinely proposed for environmental reasons.”); Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v.
Corey, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing assertion that
discriminatory purpose was evidenced by government statement that the law would help
“keep consumer dollars local”); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (rejecting an
argument that economic protectionism was evidenced by a government statement saying
Maine’s money would be better “spent at home”); see also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730
F.3d 1070, 1100 fn.13 (9th Cir. 2013) (“economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely
proposed for environmental reasons” is not evidence of a “discriminatory purpose”); cf.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627–29 (1978) (wherein the Court held a New
Jersey law, which had the purpose of protecting the state’s environment, health, and safety,
was facially discriminatory because it expressly barred only out-of-state waste, which posed
no greater risks than in-state waste. The Court acknowledged that “slowing the flow of all
waste” would be permissible under a line of cases upholding quarantine laws that blocked
“noxious” products at state borders).
260. City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.010, § 8.6.020(B) (July 20,
2016).
261. Challenging Proposed Coal Export Terminal in Oakland, California,
EARTHJUSTICE, https://perma.cc/3QHX-D8DN (“transporting and storing coal on the
Oakland waterfront poses serious short- and long-term impacts on community health and
the local environment”) (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
262. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (A) (Sterling Codifiers through
June 10, 2019).
263. Taylor Stevens, How Will the Inland Port, a Massive Project Near the Great
Salt Lake, Affect Air Quality and the Ecosystem?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://perma.cc/AHL6-Q96Q (reporting that most public comments to the City Council and
Port Board focused on environmental impacts).
264. See, e.g., Glen Mills, Salt Lake City School District raises concerns about
Inland Port, GOOD4UTAH (Sept. 11, 2018, 8:35 AM), https://perma.cc/X234-BWFC
(describing traffic, noise pollution, and air quality concerns).
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designed to regulate. The fact that Salt Lake’s ordinance also aims to
“minimize[] resource use” without regard for the geographic origin of those
resources265 does not indicate any kind of discrimination recognized by
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Further, even though Salt Lake
City’s Mayor has been an outspoken critic of the state’s takeover of the Port
area, her criticism has not questioned the commercial or interstate trade
purposes of the Port.266
Therefore, it would be easy for a court to recognize that the primary
purposes of both Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s restrictions are not
geographical, but instead have to do with the impact caused by coal from
any location on “the health and safety of [the] community,” just as the court
in South Portland, Maine did.267 Moreover, like in South Portland,268 a
court would be well-reasoned to conclude that Salt Lake City’s and
Oakland’s ordinance are free from any discriminatory purpose under the
dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Oakland’s and Salt Lakes Ordinances Could Withstand
Strict Scrutiny

Even if Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s health and safety-focused
ordinances were found to be discriminatory, they could still survive. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the dormant Commerce Clause:
does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a
[local law] does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt
to place itself in a position of economic isolation, it retains broad
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens
and the integrity of its natural resources.269
Courts would be well-reasoned to find that, under the precedent of
Maine v. Taylor, the ordinances of Oakland and Salt Lake City “serve[] a
legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means” and thus should be upheld, even if the proposed

265. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(A) (Sterling Codifiers through
June 10, 2019).
266. See, e.g., Katie McKellar, Salt Lake mayor calls for public’s help to guide port
zoning, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/NEJ6-YA5N (quoting Mayor
Biskupski as saying the city is “being forced” to meet an “arbitrary deadline,” and it is
“troubling” that the state-created port authority can overturn city zoning decisions).
267. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 304
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
268. Id. at 303.
269. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp.
3d at 151 (citations omitted).
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solutions would not be a “complete success.”270 Similar to Maine v. Taylor,
Oakland and Salt Lake City’s ordinances legitimately “guard[] against
imperfectly understood environmental risks”271 that the air emissions from
coal handling and storing would impose on nearby vulnerable
communities.272
One of the health main concerns with ports and coal shipping is fine
particulate matter, which the U.S. EPA, California EPA, World Health
Organization, and federal courts have all concluded is harmful at any
level.273 Even the American Trucking Association asserted to the Supreme
Court that “particulate matter . . . inflict[s] a continuum of adverse health
effects at any airborne concentration greater than zero.”274 This is
particularly concerning in Oakland, where an independent consultant for
the City estimated that the proposed coal terminal would result in fine
particulate matter levels over twice the daily and yearly “threshold[s] of
significance” for air quality set by California and the local Air District.275
The City of Oakland further determined that adding particulate matter
would be significant because the area was “out of attainment” with relevant
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.276 Likewise, health advocates in
Salt Lake City are concerned about the impacts of the Utah Inland Port277
because, even without the Port, Salt Lake County is in “serious nonattainment” of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulate
matter.278 It would be clear, therefore, for a court to conclude that Salt Lake

270. Maine, 477 U.S. at 138–51 (holding discriminatory laws are allowable if they
“serve[] a legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means,” even if risks are “imperfectly understood” and solution may not
be “complete success”).
271. Id. at 148.
272. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for State of California, Document 170-1 at 7,
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018) (No. 3:16-cv-07014IV) (describing pollutants that coal handling creates, and vulnerable communities
adjacent to the Oakland terminal); Mills, supra note 264 (describing air quality concerns
for low-income schoolchildren near the Utah Inland Port in Salt Lake City); Stevens,
supra note 263.
273. Motion for Summary Judgement by Defendant, Document 145 at 15, Oakland
Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-vc-07014-IV).
274. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
275. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 994–95.
276. Id. at 1004.
277. Stevens, supra note 263 (quoting an advocate: “we just don’t have a whole lot
of room to fully increase manufacturing and truck traffic that would potentially be generated
from the inland port”).
278. Emma Penrod, EPA labels Utah Air-quality Problems ‘Serious’, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/7PJK-LADB (Salt Lake County is also in “‘marginal’
non-attainment” for ozone); Emma Penrod, Feds Give Utah Three Years to Bring Ozone
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City and Oakland’s ordinances permissibly “serve[] a legitimate local
purpose”279 concerned with air quality and public health.
Salt Lake City and Oakland’s ordinances also arguably “could not
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”280 For Oakland,
the City likely lacks authority to enforce the less restrictive measures
suggested by OBOT and the district court, such as using covers or
chemical dust suppressants on rail cars carrying coal.281 The Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act may preempt directly
regulating the rail carriers, as OBOT argued in its complaint.282
Alternatively, the fact that the City likely would have limited recourse to
enforce contracts between OBOT and its sub-lessees undermines OBOT’s
suggestion that Oakland should be satisfied with its promise to require its
sub-lessees to use covers.283
Likewise, Salt Lake City’s prohibition on extractive industries and
refineries in the Inland Port284 may not be achievable through lesser means
like technical regulations, because such regulations could run into state
preemption issues, whereas zoning regulations simply barring these
harmful activities from particular locations would ordinarily be considered
safe within the City’s police powers.285 In addition, the requirement in Salt
Lake City’s ordinance that coal and crude oil handling be done in an
enclosed building, covered rail car, or open rail car if material has been
“sprayed with surfactant to reduce dust”286—while otherwise allowing

Pollution Down to Acceptable Levels, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/
DLU7-K93K.
279. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citations omitted).
280. Id.
281. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d
986, 995–98 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018).
282. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶137, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv-07014-IV). Oakland’s ordinance arguably does not cross the
ICCTA because it does not regulate rail and regulates only storing and handling of coal at
certain facilities in the city. City of Oakland, Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.010 (July 20, 2016).
283. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 996.
284. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (B)(2)(f) (Sterling Codifiers
through June 10, 2019).
285. See generally McCready, supra note 24 (providing an overview of cases where
city regulation of oil and gas fracking was preempted by state technical regulations but
where, in at least one case in New York, an outright ban prevailed over an express
preemption statute of oil and gas regulation; further arguing that state preemption of outright
bans on oil and gas drilling is not supported by the rationale that supports state preemption
of technical aspects of drilling, which is based on the desire to avoid a patchwork of
conflicting technical local regulations); see also generally infra note 298 (discussing the
authority of Utah municipalities to regulated public health and safety under State v.
Hutchinson).
286. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE ch. 21A.34.150 IP, § (E)(1)(b) (2019).
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those materials—are already strikingly minimal. Any less restrictive means
would be meaningless or not “satisfactory,” as the U.S. Supreme Court put
it in Maine v. Taylor.287
Finally, even though Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s ordinances do
not address many other sources of pollution that threaten health and
environment, courts recognize that local laws “need not strike at all
evils.”288 “[I]mpediments to complete success . . . cannot be a ground for
preventing a [local government] from using its best efforts to limit [an
environmental] risk.”289 Therefore, courts would be well-reasoned if they
were to allow Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s ordinances to survive strict
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.
C. Salt Lake’s and Oakland’s Ordinances Do Not Regulate
Extraterritorially

Just as the court in South Portland, Maine saw “little difference
between [South Portland’s] Ordinance and other zoning prohibitions” and
concluded the ordinance therefore did not violate the extraterritoriality
doctrine,290 a court should have no trouble following that same logic to
uphold Salt Lake City’s zoning ordinance. In fact, South Portland’s total
prohibition on crude oil loading in a city shipyard is far more intrusive than
Salt Lake’s ordinance, which allows coal and crude oil to be loaded and
stored so long as it is done in an enclosed building, covered rail car, or open
rail car sprayed with dust-controlling surfactants.291 Therefore, it should be
even easier for a court to uphold Salt Lake’s ordinance against in
extraterritoriality challenge. Likewise, courts should not find Oakland’s
coal ordinance to be an impermissible extraterritorial regulation, as it does
not restrict the handling of coal outside of the city’s “bulk material
facilities.”292
As in the Tenth Circuit’s Energy & Environmental Legal Institute. v.
Epel opinion authored by then-Judge Gorsuch, even if Salt Lake City’s or
Oaklands’s restrictions have “ripple effects” on markets elsewhere, the
ordinances do not “blatantly” regulate price, nor do they discriminate
against out-of-state consumers or producers.293 And, as in South Portland,
287. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141 (1986).
288. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 312
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018) (quoting
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466).
289. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151 (citations omitted).
290. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
291. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (E) (Sterling Codifiers through
June 10, 2019).
292. City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.040(B) (July 20, 2016).
293. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2015).
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Maine, “conduct is not controlled by the Ordinance[s] if it occurs outside”
the cities’ ports.294 Both Salt Lake City’s and Oaklands’s ordinances are
well within the cities’ “historic police powers” described in South
Portland.295 They are nothing more than “health and safety regulations,”
as then-Judge Gorsuch framed it, which are well within the bounds of the
dormant Commerce Clause.296 In fact, California’s Attorney General
agrees that Oakland may use its “police power to protect . . . vulnerable
residents from dangerous pollution.”297 The Utah Supreme Court has also
long recognized the general welfare power of Utah municipalities, and that
it would be “a mockery of the concept of local self-government to require
all counties to have the same ordinances as all others.”298 The fact that
Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances regulate products which come from
or go to other states does not change the fact that they only directly regulate
activities within the cities.299 Therefore, courts would be well-supported to
conclude that neither Salt Lake City’s nor Oakland’s ordnance regulate
extraterritorially.
D. Oakland and Salt Lake’s Ordinance Do Not Infringe on
Foreign Commerce

Just as in South Portland, Maine, Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s
ordinances do not interfere with the “federal government’s ability to speak
with one voice when regulating commerce with foreign governments.”300
The South Portland court aptly reasoned that “[a]ny local regulation or
prohibition on a large and important industry (fossil fuels) will inevitably

294. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
295. Id.
296. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1174.
297. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for State of California, Document 170-1 at 7,
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (No. 3:16-vc-07014-IV).
298. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (holding that, because
Utah statutorily granted the “general welfare power to local governments, those
governments have independent authority apart from, and in addition to, specific grants of
authority to pass ordinances which are reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives
of that power, i.e. providing for the public safety, health, morals, and welfare” (citing Salt
Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (1968))); see also DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY STATE HANDBOOK 408–09 (2002) (describing how State v. Hutchinson
established a “statutory home role” for Utah local governments).
299. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[t]he
Commerce Clause does not protect [a business’s] ability to make others pay for the hidden
harms of their products merely because those products are shipped across state lines”).
300. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 313–
14 (D. Me. 2018) (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979)),
appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018).
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touch on federal commerce in a broad sense, given the realities of a modern
globalized society,” and the mere fact that an ordinance has “‘foreign
resonances’ because it impacts a piece of cross-border infrastructure and a
large industry” does not put it in conflict with the Commerce Clause.301
Likewise, the mere fact that the coal industry or other industries hope to
ship their products to international markets via ports in Oakland and Salt
Lake City does not mean those cities’ ordinances violate the dormant
Commerce Clause, where they neither target any foreign countries, nor
force market participants to comply with inconsistent burdens.

V. Conclusion
Utah’s coal industry got a temporary win with the Oakland district
court decision, but municipalities have the power to win the larger fight
over restrictions on fossil fuels at their ports. The recent decisions in South
Portland, Maine and Portland, Oregon demonstrate that municipal bans on
fossil fuel shipping and handling at ports can withstand dormant Commerce
Clause challenges. Further, these two Portland decisions, alongside
precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court,302 the Tenth Circuit under Justice
Gorsuch,303 and the Ninth Circuit304 suggest that Oakland’s coal ban and
Salt Lake City’s restrictions on coal, oil, refineries, and extractive
industries could and should withstand dormant Commerce Clause
challenges. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the Commerce Clause does not require communities “to sit
idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has
occurred . . . before [they] act[] to avoid such consequences.”305 This is
also consistent with scholarship calling for recognition of a legal right to
“local self-determination”306 or “community self-governance”307 for
environmental problems.
301. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 315–16.
302. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (facially discriminatory law survived
strict scrutiny where state sought to “guard [. . .] against imperfectly understood
environmental risks” and there were no feasible, less restrictive means); see Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (upholding law prohibiting one industry from
retail sales in-state).
303. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015)
(upholding Colorado renewable energy law against dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
even though “some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business”).
304. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (upholding Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard); see
also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013) (largely
upholding California’s low carbon fuel standard).
305. Maine, 477 U.S. at 141.
306. Briffault, supra note 37.
307. Linzey and Brannen, supra note 37.
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However, while cities such as Oakland and Salt Lake City have viable
options to achieve their goals of avoiding harmful emissions from coal and
oil handling in their ports without running afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause, it is also clear from Oakland and Portland that cities will need to
be vigilant in their fact-finding to support their ordinances, as courts may
apply a scrutinizing eye under administrative or contract law.308 Cities will
also need to take precautions to ensure their ordinances do not cross the line
of other claims frequently raised, including state preemption of municipal
authority and federal preemption by statutes regulating trains, ports, and
pipelines.309 If cities avoid these pitfalls, they will not be prohibited—by
the dormant Commerce Clause or otherwise—from restricting fossil fuels
at their ports.

308. See supra Part II, discussing how the Oakland court held the record lacked the
contractually required “substantial evidence” of health and safety risks, and the Portland
court held Portland’s ordinance lacked an “adequate factual basis” because one of the city’s
factual findings did not adequately combat countervailing evidence.
309. See supra Part I, note 40 and accompanying text.
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